Lower level biological laboratories are proliferating across the world and regularly working with new biological materials, genetically engineered viruses, nanomaterials and other biological materials. As this research rapidly expands, a broader scrutiny of health and safety issues is necessary. CRG is working toward the institution of openly accessible and enforceable standards and practices in this area.
In high containment laboratories, genetic engineering has the potential to revolutionize biological warfare. Through techniques of genetic analysis and modification, steadily increasing in sophistication since the creation of the Human Genome Project, scientists now have the ability to modify deadly disease-causing agents to enhance their resilience and ease of infection, by selecting genes that hasten the onset of particular symptoms when put in contact with the body or possess a resistance to common treatments.
CRG works for an end to the development and use of biological weapons, as well to so-called biological "defense" research with clear offensive applications. To advance this effort, CRG continues to put pressure on the United States to ratify the verification and enforcement protocols of the BTWC and extend the Convention to cover all genetic modification of biological agents for military purposes.
Help Protect Worker Safety in the Biological IndustriesCRG in the Press
Pfizer Case Raises the Profile of Lab Safety,
The Day, April 2010
Becky McClain's Crusade against Pfizer,
CounterPunch (Ralph Nader), April 2010
A Pfizer Whistleblower is Awarded $1.4 Million,
NY Times, April 2010
Ex-Pfizer Worker Cites Genetically Engineered Virus in Lawsuit Over Firing,
Harford Courant, March 2010
Background Materials
Plan to Engineer Smallpox Virus Causes Alarm
Mistakes Happen: Accidents and Security Breaches at High-Security Biocontainment Facilities
CRG's Statement On U.S. Bioweapons Initiatives
Call for a Ban on Genetic Alteration of Pathogens for Destructive Purposes
Articles
Bioshield, Biosword, by Victor Sidel, GeneWatch, September 2004
A Biolab in Boston?, by Sujatha Byravan, GeneWatch, September 2004
Rocky Mountain Fever, by Mary Wulff, GeneWatch, September 2004
The Crack in Bioshield's Armor, by Peter Shorett, GeneWatch, September 2004
New Germ Labs Stir a Debate Over Secrecy and Safety, New York Times 1 February 2004
Fools Rush In by Lola Vollen, GeneWatch, March 2003
Rethinking the Biological Warfare Problem by Susan Wright, GeneWatch, March 2003
Boston Residents Should Decide Future of Biolab by Sujatha Byravan and Sheldon Krimsky, GeneWatch, January 2003
Biowar and Peace by Lauren Davis, GeneWatch, September 2002
A Tale of Two Treaties by David Keppel, GeneWatch, March 2002
Double Language and Biological Warfare by Susan Wright, GeneWatch, March 2002
Biowarfare and the Department of Energy by Tim King, GeneWatch, November 2001
Resources
The Sunshine Project / www.sunshine-project.org
The Henry L. Stimson Center / www.stimson.org
Federation of American Scientists Chemical and Biological Arms Control Program / www.fas.org/bwc
Center for Nonproliferation Studies / www.cns.miis.edu
The Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation / www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/
Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center (CBIAC) / https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) / http://www.sipri.org/
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute (CBACI)
Citizen's Center for Biohazard Prevention / http://homepage2.nifty.com/bio-anzenken/index-e.htm